

do with this Ministry, the official connection would facilitate its future investigation and research, as well as publicity. However, the name has been changed into Bureau of Industrial and Commercial Information, and so also has its Chinese name been altered. Being one of its founders, the editor of "The Critic" is included to write an ad memorian to the old office, which seems to have died with the change of name. However, it is hoped that the spirit of the Bureau will remain, and its work will be even improved after the re-organization. In which case the death of the old office will be immediately followed by its rebirth under a new name, and the whole thing be renovated under the supervision of the Nationalist Government. Therefore, congratulations for the rebirth are also in order.

Although publicity and propaganda are often mistaken to be one and the same thing, or rather the former is often mistaken to be the latter, and vice versa, there is really a world of difference between the two, in spite of the fact that they both begin with the

letter "p" and come near each other in the dictionary. The object of the former is to present facts, and let the public form its own opinion. The latter aims at creating impressions, in favor of something which the propagandist wishes to advocate. The former appeals to reason; the latter appeals to sentiments and works on the suggestibility of the crowd.

One great hope we entertain towards the new Bureau is that it will maintain or improve its former standard as an institute of economic research, and if it continues its publicity work, it will be genuine publicity, and not propaganda. This depends as much on the Ministry which controls the office as on the Bureau staff itself.

Incidentally, we may say that genuine publicity is also the object of "The Critic." Being a magazine on current affairs, it cannot avoid expressing opinions, but the opinions are intended to appeal to the reason, not the sentiments, of its readers. Our motto is: Let the outside world know China better, but we do not try to create any bias in her favor.

Is the Idealism of the Kuomintang Dead?

By T. F. Tsiang

Mr. G. K. Chesterton, writing in a recent issue of "The Illustrated London News," had some very pessimistic things to say about revolutions in general. Let me quote his own words:

Utopia always wins best in what is, in another than the Wellsian sense, a War in the Air. When the heavenly kingdom becomes an earthly paradise, it sometimes tends to be a hell upon earth. But it sometimes tends to be even worse, or at least weaker—a very earthly imitation of the earth. So long as a revolution is a failure, we all feel that it holds the promise of success. It is when it is a success that it is so often a failure.

To this one might add the pithy saying of a Frenchman, whose national history records more revolutions than probably that of any other people: "The more it changes, the more it is the same."

The attitude of mind expressed by Mr. Chesterton and the Frenchman in regard to revolutions in general is being held by not a few foreigners and Chinese at this very moment in regard to the particular revolution that China is going through. To cite a few examples: "The Japanese Revenue Diplomatique" of July, first editorially says that there are five things one should lament about in regard to the success of the Chinese Revolutionary Army. The writer carefully lays five layers of mud on China and things Chinese. That the Japanese should lament the success of the Northern Expedition is probably to be taken for granted, although from the bottom of our hearts, we cannot see how Chinese unity can injure Japanese interests. Another magazine—"The

China Outlook" of Peking—opines that the idealism of the Kuomintang began to decline ever since Nanking triumphed over Hankow and that by this time, it is quite dead, if not already buried. "The Outlook" is very friendly to China and stands for ideals which I for one would like to see realized. It is when papers of the type of "The Outlook" become skeptical that we should truly search our hearts and try to do better. Let us therefore ask in all frankness, Is the Idealism of the Kuomintang Dead?

To avoid all misunderstanding we must agree as to what these ideals are. Their direct source is the collected writings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Indirectly, and one might say ultimately, they spring from the yearnings of the entire Chinese people. The first ideal is national independence, or national emancipation from all the servitudes that have been imposed upon China during the past century. The shame and anguish that we have felt during all these years because we have been branded inferior in the family of nations should be once for all removed: This idealism of nationalism, if it existed in the mid-nineteenth century, would be acclaimed by the greatest spirits of that time, by John Stuart Mill in England, Earnest Renan in France, and Francis Lieber in America. Unfortunately, China's battle for national freedom is being fought in the third decade of the twentieth century, when nationalism is, if not objected to, certainly wearied of. There is a very good reason for this: a nation passes very easily from nationalism to irredentism and from irredentism to imperialism. People are afraid that China may not be able to break this cyclic law. I grant that this particular ideal is somewhat old-fashioned, but I am not ready to grant that it

is useless. I would call the attention of China's friends to the fact that Dr. Sun's nationalism is not petty or narrow or exclusive. His most favorite motto was: the World for the Common Welfare of Mankind. But he saw definitely that unless China became a fully independent and sovereign nation, she could not contribute anything to the making of that better international order which he had so much at heart. China's nationalism was to him a necessary preliminary step to true internationalism.

No one can say that the followers of Dr. Sun have forgotten this ideal. Nor can one assert that they have debased it. The Chinese people remain, in spite of their passionate desire for a revision of treaties, internationally-minded. The best proof for this is that the Awakened Lion Magazine group, with all its eloquence and learning on behalf of extreme nationalism, has acquired a very limited following. The pleas do not find a responsive chord in the younger generation. And the Kuomintang while on the one hand pressing very hard for the negotiation of new treaties, is at the same time putting the propaganda of the Awakened Lion group under the ban. I don't approve of this limitation of freedom of speech, but I only wish to point out that the Kuomintang has remained true to its leader's ideal of safe nationalism.

Dr. Sun's true title to statesmanship is, in my mind, not his nationalism, but his social and economic program. The greatest question before the Chinese people today is the form that the industrial revolution will take in China. We can follow the laissez-faire policy of England and the United States and let a few individuals exploit the new means of production for personal profit. We can also follow the example of Russia and sacrifice oceans of blood and treasure for the realization of a dogmatic ideology. Dr. Sun did neither. He was in sympathy with Russian aims, but he strongly opposed the Russian means. He knew that those means would not work in China. He knew that China was not Russia and therefore new means must be devised. His solution was national control of the industrial revolution for the purpose of promoting common welfare. He often said that his doctrine was also communism, but he pointed out the difference between his communism and that of Western Communists. He wished to socialize not existing capital but the capital to be created in future by the mechanical revolution. He saw his opportunity of guiding China into the path of a socialist commonwealth without the horrors of a class war. This, to my mind, is true creative statesmanship. It is the most vital ideal that he has left to the Kuomintang. Whether the Party has remained true or not to its leader should be judged more on this score than on anything else.

In the field of social policy, circumstances have not been favorable to the Kuomintang. The Party had to fight Soviet intrigues, and in this fight it had to rely in part on elements which are fundamentally opposed to Dr. Sun's vision. Secondly, the war against the militarists had to be pushed through. This absorbed the energies of the Party. In war time, it is very difficult

to promote better social ideals. This is true of all nations. During the European War, Laborites, Social Democrats, and Socialists in all countries practically gave up their struggle for a better social order. The question may be raised whether it would not have been better for Kuomintang to devote its energies to reconstruction in the wide area under its control instead of concentrating its whole force on the Northern Expedition. While plausible arguments can be advanced in favor of this view, I am personally convinced that the Party's decision, whatever its motives, was right. Any temporary compromise with national division is detrimental to the ultimate interests of China. The country must be one nation or half a dozen of nations. Any hope of a Northern and a Southern China settling down side by side is illusory and immoral. Unity was and is a primary necessity for the present and future welfare of the nation. The price paid for it, while large, was justified by necessity. Lamentations on this score are simply muddle-headedness. Finally, the Nanking government, after losing the Russian friend, had to find international sympathy elsewhere. All possible sympathizers felt that the less said about a possible better social order, the better it was both for China and for the world. In other words, the reactionary movement started in the West after the Great War is making its influence felt in China. And Kuomintang driven by sheer necessity, was not strong enough to resist it. Under the circumstances, had Dr. Sun been still living, I don't believe he could have resisted it either.

As a result of all this, the record of Kuomintang is barren of achievement in the social sphere. Even the earlier enthusiasm for a better social order is on the decline. I admit this is not a good symptom, but I believe we cannot deliver sentence on such a brief record. The true test will come in the next few years, as the Party settles down to the real constructive work. And we must remember that the vision as conceived by Dr. Sun does not require so much romantic propaganda as detailed prosaic investigation and planning. The Party will have to consult experts, negotiate with capitalists, create an honest and efficient bureaucracy, and persist through all difficulties. There is no social Bastille for Chinese revolutionists to take. Consequently, newspapers will not be able to furnish nourishment to the romantically minded, who cannot conceive of a revolution that is not spectacular. The best guarantee we have of the vitality of Kuomintang social ideal is the consciousness among its leaders that the revolution, far from finished, has only begun. These leaders have spoken outright that the Party should not confuse the end of the Northern Expedition with the end of the revolution. As the German scholar Sombart said, a revolution is only the projection of a program to be realized by the succeeding generations. It took France almost a century to carry out the Rights of Man. Not what Kuomintang has or has not done during the past year, but what it will do in the next few years and decades, is its test. While no one can say that the Party will meet the test successfully, one can at least say that it is conscious of the test and is trying to meet it.

There are many things to disappoint well-wishers of China. If we remember human nature and its workings everywhere, we will have more patience. After a recent trip to Shanghai, I felt for a time quite dejected. I picked up Colonel House's "Intimate Papers" to read, to soothe my mental disturbance. I found plenty of material for laughter and consolation. For example, Professor Seymour, the editor of the Intimate Papers, summarizing the situation of the Democratic Party after the electoral success of 1912, has this to say: "The victory of 1912 was the first won by the Democrats in a presidential election since 1892, an even twenty years

... long political exile will have sharpened every one's appetite for office, and the first indication of success at the polls will sound like a dinner gong, gathering the ravenous horde of anxious place-hunters, whose ability is apt to be in inverse ratio to their eagerness." Well, the followers of the Three Principles are not different in nature from the followers of the New Freedom. In spite of this, Wilson's first administration was a landmark in American domestic legislation. We should wait till the first administration of the Kuomintang is pretty well on its way, before we pronounce its ideals dead.

A Psychological View on China's Troubles

By Charles L. Wu

In a previous issue of this same magazine there appeared an article, "An Anthropological view on China's Troubles," by Mr. Quentin Pan. I heartily agree with him that the source of China's troubles lies deeper than popular notions, such as the lack of a centralized government, poverty and low standard of living among the masses, ignorance and illiteracy or the disrupting influences of the foreign imperialism. He has sufficiently demonstrated that the real solution lies in the direction of biology instead of politics, education or religion. In this article I share his view that the improvement of the material welfare will not save China from decadence. But differing with him I wish to call attention to some of the psychological factors involved. It is my contention that China's salvation lies in the development of a public morale, a spirit of cooperation, and a loyalty to public institutions by the people in general and by the public servants in particular. This is a century of cooperative enterprises and this is a century of group competition. If we Chinese can not adjust our attitude and acclimate ourselves to this atmosphere, our renaissance would be a forlorn hope.

In spite of China's extensive territory with primitive means of communication, her innumerable dialects many of which are utterly unintelligible to each other, and other unfavorable factors, China has outlived all her ancient contemporaries. She has witnessed the birth, maturity and passing away of many nations but she herself, senile and dotardly though she might look, can proudly join the chorus of Tenneyson's Brook, "Men may come and men may go, but I go on forever." Among the more important factors of this wonderful stability we may mention:

1. The racial homogeneity of the people
2. The geographical isolation
3. The unity of social thought—based on the Confucian classics
4. The stability of the family

With the exception of the first, all other points now cease to be the facts. The Great Gobi Desert, the unsurmountable Himalayas, and the boundless oceans, which once well served as our frontier guards and defied many an enemy, must now bow down before the mighty feats of aeronautics and ship-building. China at present can be approached on all sides, hence she is no longer geographically isolated.

As to the unity of social thought it is again true only historically. Since the recent cultural contact with the West, China's system of social thought is directly challenged by the Western scientific spirit. After a short lapse of indifference due to inertia she soon opens her arms to welcome the newer theories. As the result of the indiscriminating absorption of the Western thought, China becomes the dumping ground of all kinds of isms, sects, doctrines and principles. The once infallible Confucian classics has to yield its place to Christianity, Socialism, Bolshevism and what not. Every shade of radicalism as well as every shade of conservatism has its enthusiastic followers. In this huge melting pot smoulder these altogether different social theories and doctrines which, however, yield no chemical affinity but an intellectual feudalism.

Now let us turn to the stability of the family. Elders in China have enjoyed the undisputable authority for milleniums, but now they are lamenting over the unruliness of their progenies. Men were used to treat their woman folks as chattel and women had not even the right to complain. But now the condition is different. Among the rapid growth of divorces we notice that a large proportion is initiated by the dominated sex. So we see that the old Chinese family system is under the process of disintegration. Of course we must admit that even under the old regime the stability is quickly passing away. While we are not defending the old family system, especially its brutal aspects, we look with disdain at the irregular marital relationship that is now fairly widespread. Temporary unions, that is, cohabitation without due ceremony, are multiplying with great